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Abstract
As organizations become more dependent upon software-based information systems, the
potential for unforeseen crises increases. In this paper, we explore the relationship
between software failure and organizational responsibilities.
0.0 Introduction
The author of this short essay once received the following comments from a reviewer:
`` (in this paper) a great deal of time is spent stating something quite obvious: that IR
information retrieval) systems should be useful and reliable.''
While the blithe observation is quite true, reality reflects a different situation. Information
systems are not reliable, and so cannot be considered useful. Users and designers of
information systems seem to forget that IS are not only computer-based systems, they are
software-bound systems. Hence, these systems experience the same sorts of failures and
vulnerabilities which characterize software.
In this short essay, the consequences of organizational dependence upon software-based
technologies is explored. Toward this end, a historical basis for the examination of
``computer ethics'' is established. Then, the need to include special issues regarding
software into ethical thought about automation and the organization is proposed in order
to explore the following premise: an organization has a responsibility to ensure its
survival, internal health, and growth toward the goal of accomplishing its mission.
Finally, an answer is constructed to the following question. What are the responsibilities
which an organization takes onto itself which result from reliance upon software-bound
information technologies?
1.0 Frameworks for Computer Ethics
The works of two authors [Moor], [Mason] have greatly influenced exploration and
discussion of computer ethics. Mason's PAPA model identifies the four ``basic rights''
which a society has with regard to information technologies. These are the right to:

- privacy,
- accuracy (of information),
- property, and
- access (to information).
[Moor] identifies factors unique to information technologies which must be considered
when exploring how automation affects the ethical beliefs of a society. These factors are:
- logical malleability of software,
- transformation ability of software,
- the ``invisible'' factors:
invisible programming factors,
invisible complex calculations, and
invisible abuse.
Mason's work examines ways in which information technologies affect these basic rights
which a society has, while Moor's work identifies unique aspects of information
technologies which result in changes to how we think about these rights. Both of these
influential works identify consequences of the results of automation. Still, neither
considers in detail how the underlying basis of automation --- software --- affects ethical
considerations of a society, organization, or individual.
A great deal of thought and experimentation has been undertaken in order to understand
what software is and to ascertain its effect on systems created using software. As a result
of this work, a very strong conclusion about software can be made. This is that the
complex nature of software results in inability to verify its correctness. That is, complex
software systems cannot be shown to be reliable [Leveson and Turner], [Borning],
[Parnas]. While we also know that complex software systems have failed in the past, with
dire consequences, methods to build safer, more reliable software still fall short
[Leveson], [Leveson and Turner], [Littlewood and Strigini].
These considerations lead to the observation that organizations which rely upon softwarebased information technologies to manage their information resource are reliant upon
high risk systems. Organizations are dependent on systems which are neither reliable, nor
correct.
2.0 On the Nature of Software

In this section, special considerations of software not commonly pursued in the
management literature are introduced. Software is a logical product which uses discrete
functions to achieve some desired effect. A number of authors have identified a number
of factors which are unique to software. [Parnas] illustrates that fundamental
technological differences exist between software products and other products which have
been successfully produced. Influences contributing to the unreliable nature of software
include, but are not limited to, human lack of understanding of discrete functions and
poor software development practices. Poor software development practices result in
poorly designed software being released, software being released, not when its reliability
can be demonstrated, but after the rate of ``bug'' discovery falls below an acceptable
threshold [Littlewood and Strigini]. Corbato recognizes the following contributing
factors. Complexities arising from:
- the large scale of most software products,
- the many levels of management involved in development of software products,
- subordinate reluctance to report bad news,
- the youth of software development,
-rapid changes occurring in the technological realm.
Software weaknesses cannot be overcome or averted by attempts to correct failures as
they are detected:
``...Most assume the failure rate is reduced whenever an error is corrected. They also
assume the reduction in failure rates resulting from each correction are predictable. These
assumptions are not justified by either theoretical or empirical studies of programs.''
[Parnas, van Schouwen and Kwan, p. 447]
Much of the work cited deals with large software systems, frequently these systems
control and/or manage complex processes. Many organizational information systems are
of a smaller nature and their failure will not lead to extreme crises such as the Challenger
or Therac-25 disasters. However, software related failures of these systems can result in
major crises within an organization.
3.0 Software and the Organization
The management of, and interaction with, no other resource is handled as carelessly as
the information resource. Software-dependent organizations pursue a conscious policy of
software-oriented ignorance, evading the effort of responsibly integrating and managing
software development effort. Management of software and system development is then
unselfconsciously relegated to the control of a small number of information technology
specialists. The nature of software, and development of software-based applications,
contributes greatly management's lack of understanding of the information resource. The

ability to understand and interact with software is still much relegated to the realm of the
``nerd.'' The organization has abdicated control over the information resource
management process in an unprecedented manner. This leads to:
- lack of non-information technology
specialist influence over the software
development process,
- lack of non-information technology specialist understanding of vulnerabilities and risks
of the IS,
- organizations allowing more and more complex tasks to be automated without adequate
preparation for possible failure of these systems,
- lack of development of useful measures which will allow the organization to remove
information resource management from the hands of a small cadre of individuals,
- development of methods which allow information resource management to be audited
and controlled.
The organization which uses software applications can either develop software in-house,
or rely on software developed by another organization. Although organizations, for the
most part, now understand that information is a critical resource and have included a
strategic planning function for
information resource management, actual control of the software development process
remains an alien undertaking.
Historically, the software dependent organization engages in a naive relationship with
regard to the IS development function, relegating IS implementation and maintenance to
a relatively small number of highly skilled and knowledgeable professionals. The
organization then proceeds to depend upon the ISes developed by these professionals
with little or no questions as to the system's inherent reliability and safety. Conversely,
and ironically, it is lack of understanding of organizations units which do not participate
in the software development process which perpetuates and aggravates the notion of
``gutless estimating,'' [Brooks] that is, dismissing and overriding the time and costs
estimates of software developing professionals without understanding of the methods and
constraints which led to original estimations.
4.0 Conclusion
Despite the risks to which software dependence makes an organization vulnerable,
organizations continue to allow the IS development function to remain isolated from
other function areas of the organization. Organizations also maintain and re-enforce a

policy of willful ignorance regarding the software-based systems used to manage the
information resource. Hence, the organization willfully acts in a manner which fails to
ensures its own health and survivability, a manner which in fact, increases the possibility
of crisis and decline. The organizations fails to fulfill the responsibilities it has with
regard to understanding the consequences of software dependence. The dubious
statement can be made then, that the organization willfully participates in activities which
can lead to its own demise.
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